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Now, more than ever before, good advice is held to be a 
function of its knowledge base. Advisers seek connections 
between information, knowledge, policy and outcomes. 
Given issue complexity, multiple values and competing 
sources of information, lively debate focuses on various 
qualities of knowledge, and its production, management 
and relevance. Some policy advisers and decision makers 
equate ‘good’ knowledge with expert and scientific 
‘evidence’. Others proclaim the worth of local and 
‘interpretive’ knowledge, which arises from consultation, 
dialogue and mutual learning processes. Unfortunately, 
debate centred on the qualities of knowledge tacitly 
assumes that good qualities automatically increase the 
odds of good policy. In my classes, I point to the fl oor, 
and ask participants to imagine it occupied by a gold-star 
‘evidence base’. I ask them to imagine walking up to that 
heap, and begging it to speak. They laugh, for no matter 
how much information and knowledge is amassed, how 
excellent its qualities, policy advice is a function of both 
knowledge and capable thinking and reasoning. 
Policy Thinking: From ‘If ... Then’ 
to ‘What If ...’
Amanda Wolf
effectively pursue ‘what if ...’ inquiry, who think 
‘laterally’ and who exhibit a bloodhound’s skill in nosing 
out promising ideas are held in the highest esteem by 
their peers and superiors. 
Two additional modes of thinking fall between the critical 
and the creative (see Table 1). First, multidisciplinary 
thinking, which is essentially the application of multiple 
critical frameworks, differs from basic critical thinking 
in that the inquirer uses different lenses to investigate 
the same issue and emphasises the integration of the 
resulting knowledge. Some proponents of creativity (or 
its synonym, ‘innovation’) equate it with the excellent 
conduct of tasks within a critical framework, whether 
single- or multidisciplinary, noting that ‘creativity is 
the child of technical excellence’. Others, however, who 
sustain a clear distinction between the realms of analytic 
and innovative reasoning, evoke a second additional 
mode of thinking by claiming that both critical and 
creative thinking is needed – to one degree or another, 
depending on context – to produce excellent advice.
Modes of thinking
 Critical/Analytic Multidisciplinary Creative/Critical Creative/Synthetic
Inquiry If … then  If... If … If … then What if ... then What if ...
Source of  Application of  Integration,  Experience,  Hunches, open
new ideas  rules  synthesis knowledge, logic inquiry
Current rhetoric suggests a dichotomy between thinking 
that is either critical and analytical, or creative and 
synthetic. Managers and decision makers value – as 
they should – analytical and technical competency 
in advice. They give keen attention to analysts’ ‘if ... 
then’ inquiry and its application to scientifi c evidence 
in justifying recommended actions. Nevertheless, 
calls for ‘innovative’ or ‘creative’ thinking resound in 
contemporary policy-making circles. Advisers who 
This article is about thinking for policy advice. (See 
Box 1 for some defi nitions of thinking, reasoning and 
related terms.) Guidance for critical thinking is readily 
available. But regardless of whether creative thinking 
is part of, or complements, analytical thinking, little 
practical guidance is available for increasing its amount 
and quality. As a result, policy advice may remain poor 
in ‘new’ ideas, even as new ideas are widely regarded as 
keys to progress. 
Table 1: Modes of thinking
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here. The fi rst example illustrates the emergence of a 
technically competent researcher’s new idea. Richard 
Ellwood reports what he calls ‘critical research insights’ 
in the case of poverty policy. Using longitudinal data on 
family income, Ellwood shows that there are two sides 
to poverty and public assistance:
Most of those who were just becoming needy for 
the fi rst time and most of those who were just 
beginning aid for the fi rst time had relatively 
short episodes. Thus, most of those who had ever 
had an episode of poverty or public assistance 
receipt moved off assistance fairly quickly. Yet, 
seemingly in contradiction, most of those poor at 
a point in time or receiving aid at a given moment 
[i.e. those picked up in ‘snapshot’ cross-sectional 
data studies] were in the midst of a much longer 
period of need [emphasis in original]. 
Since only a small minority of new entrants at any 
point in time become long-term recipients of assistance, 
Ellwood argues for a shift in policy focus. The new 
approach would address ways of reducing long-term 
welfare use, why a person’s poverty status changes, and 
how to ‘dampen movements into poverty and facilitate 
movements out of poverty’. 
The ‘hairdresser-counsellor’ is an example of creative 
thinking based in everyday experience. As reported in 
the Chicago Sun Times on 25 April 2006, ‘Cut It Out’ 
is a nationwide programme in the United States to train 
hairdressers to recognise warning signs of abuse and 
safely refer clients to local resources. This programme 
was initiated by salon professionals, but clearly resonates 
with policy knowledge. The banner headline on the Cut 
It Out website reports that 31% of women report being 
physically abused by an intimate partner at some point 
in their lives. Yet a Chicago offi cial cites evidence that 
most victims of domestic violence never call the police 
or go to social service agencies. Hairdressers have an 
intimate association with their clients. Cut It Out trains 
them to observe bruises and places where hair has been 
pulled out, or to appropriately interpret ‘No, he won’t 
let me’ when they suggest a new style. Clients may then 
be directed to discreet referral cards, which salons report 
constantly need replenishment. 
What Elwood knew scientifically and practically 
grounded his problem-solving, ‘if ... then’, thinking, 
which led to an insight with significant policy 
Box 1: Some defi nitions
In everyday use, and as used generally in this 
article, ‘thinking’ serves for a range of related 
concepts. This box introduces some of the mental 
activities and qualities as they apply in policy 
analysis, with assistance from the Oxford English 
Dictionary.
Thinking is baseline mental activity – cogitation, 
meditation or similar. To think is to form a 
thought or other product of a mental process, 
to exercise the mind, to form connected ideas of 
any kind; to have, or make, a train of ideas pass 
through the mind. 
Reasoning refers to a particular kind of ‘train of 
ideas’, in which one judgement is deduced from 
another or others which are given, or, more 
loosely, in which various given elements are 
ordered in some manner. That is, to reason is to 
think in a connected and sensible manner.
In the public sphere we are particularly interested 
in reasoning that is both ‘public’ and ‘practical’. 
Public and practical reasoning is a social and 
ethical interaction regarding what we should or 
will do. The locus or ownership of reasoning is 
public. It may be collective, in a ‘civic discourse’ 
manner, or it may be done by individuals, such as 
public servants and politicians, on behalf of the 
public. Its purpose is decision making. It draws 
on reasoners’ beliefs and experiences. It relates to 
some specifi c impetus to act, such as a defi ned 
policy problem that requires a decision, and it 
focuses on guiding action. Public and practical 
reasoning, whether good or not, thus has real-
world consequences. 
Reasoning as I have defi ned it is systematic, but it 
may, or may not, be logical. Logic is a slippery term 
that connotes both a particular way of ‘exercising 
the mind’ by making inferences, and the ‘art’ or 
‘science’ involved in making inferences. 
Two examples
Before turning to more detailed consideration of policy 
thinking, I set out the main argument (in the next 
section) with the assistance of two examples presented 
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implications. With extensive experience in both policy 
and research, Ellwood knew enough about poverty and 
welfare dependence to resolve the ‘seeming contradiction’ 
in new longitudinal data. Equally, he was able to connect 
the resolution of the data issue to an appropriate policy 
focus. Someone trained in data analysis, but lacking 
Ellwood’s policy experience, might measure and observe, 
but not interpret effectively. Similarly, someone steeped 
in a particular government’s welfare policy might not 
have had the selectivity of focus to shift attention to the 
‘switch points’ into and out of poverty.
The hairdresser-counsellor example is emblematic of 
what inquirers can come to know for themselves as they 
observe, deliberate, or learn from their own or others’ 
experiences through a creative ‘what if ...’ inquiry. In 
these cases, no particular technical expertise is called 
upon, nor must the analyst already be a subject expert. 
The expert on domestic violence and the salon owner 
are equally able to ask, ‘What if we found a way to 
safely make referrals in a salon?’ and to follow through 
to organise training and materials.
The argument in a nutshell
If policy advice is to address more effectively issues like 
the poverty-welfare dependency or the domestic violence 
referral challenges, I argue that we can do with less 
attention to specifi c facts and mechanistic knowledge-
handling skill. Instead, we need to pay more attention 
to the analyst-advisers’ inquiry, and to the internal 
resources from which that inquiry emanates. Internal 
resources include a person’s natural capacities, strategies, 
thoughts, experiences and disciplines, and their mental 
activities in the process of reasoning. 
A crucial capacity is the ability and willingness to 
embrace contradiction, confl ict, or what Charles Peirce, 
the late 19th-century pragmatic philosopher, called 
‘genuine doubt’ in order to be effectively primed for 
new ideas. Embracing genuine doubt means pausing 
at the open point in an inquiry (though not for too 
long – many open inquiries need to be closed by some 
resolution, however provisional). The analyst must resist 
artifi cially constraining the ‘ifs’ in order to achieve a 
tidy resolution. The analyst must be able to initiate new 
chains of ideas by engaging fully in the inquiry.
Embracing genuine doubt will often lead an inquirer 
to consider the relational nature of social or human 
behaviour. Often what is new in policy is hidden in plain 
sight, just as hairdressers have been talking and listening 
to clients’ woes since the fi rst commercial haircut. 
Detecting something new requires the analyst to adjust 
the focal depth of her inquiry, to reframe the question. 
We know, for instance, that out of all the people who 
know how much alcohol is safe or legal to consume 
before driving, and who drink past that point, only some 
will then drive. Researchers often examine the aggregate 
characteristics of the drivers and the resisters, compare 
the two groups, and propose some interventions to turn 
drivers into resisters. Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, 
a genuine doubter and reframing wizard, suggests that 
many people are simultaneously drivers and resisters. 
Among the drink drivers on any given night are resisters 
whose self-control has lapsed. The relevant comparison 
may be between person A who has vowed never to drive 
drunk and person A who nevertheless drives drunk. 
In addition, more attention is needed to the collective 
resources that can be brought to bear on policy advice. 
These, most simply, include the combined internal 
resources of others – contemporary or historical – that are 
available to the analyst. In particular, collective resources are 
available in the institutional and political contexts in which 
an inquirer engages, and might include essentially, and not 
only instrumentally, ecological and cultural resources. 
Commentators, in the main, assert that poor analysis is 
analysis that fails to use information well, or to select and 
apply models correctly, and so on. Public policy and social 
research educators are urged to improve the technical 
competency of graduates and practitioners. I argue a 
different point. Education and professional development, 
while continuing to support analysts’ development of 
problem-solving analytical approaches, might inspire 
analysts to rely somewhat less on external aids to 
thinking – the raw ingredients and tools such as stocks of 
information, pre-set problems, textbook solutions, ‘best’ 
or ‘smart’ practices, and knowledge management systems 
– and more on their experience and innate capacity to 
come up with new ideas worth considering. 
The case for new ideas from policy 
thinking
Paul Callaghan, refl ecting on a project supported by the 
Smash Palace Fund that brought writers and physicists 
together to imagine and share in the ‘what if ...’ activities 
at the centre of both art and science, quotes Richard 
Feynman on imagination. The conviction holds equally 
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for policy, as I show with my bracketed inserts: 
Our kind of [policy] imagination is quite a 
diffi cult game. One has to have the imagination 
to think of something that has never been seen 
[suggested/tried] before, never been heard of before. 
At the same time the thoughts are restricted 
in a straightjacket, so to speak, limited by the 
conditions that come from our knowledge of the 
way nature [society/human behaviour] really is. 
‘Innovation’ and ‘creativity’ have not always been part 
of the analyst’s job description. Even so, a two-sided, 
or hybrid, capacity has long been endorsed. As early as 
1979, in Speaking Truth to Power, Wildavsky cast analysis 
as both social interaction (politics and preferences) and 
intellectual cogitation (planning and causal knowledge). 
Since then, no one can have missed the ‘art and craft’ 
or ‘art and science’ descriptions which he originated. 
He wrote that ‘analysis is imagination’ and ‘analysis is 
creating and crafting problems worth solving’. More 
recently, we have Bardach, author of a slim distillation 
of advice to analysts: ‘policy analysis is more art than 
science. It draws on intuitions as much as methods’. 
However, in Wildavsky’s and Bardach’s texts, and 
indeed in all my investigations, I have found that the 
practical meaning of ‘the art of policy analysis’ is either 
ignored once the dutiful rhetorical fl ourish is ended, 
or it is applied, in its craft interpretation, to elements 
of technical professional skill: skill in the selection and 
use of materials (information, data) and tools (methods, 
models), and skill in tailoring or constructing policy 
solutions from generic inputs (theories, interventions, 
New Zealand-specifi c conditions). The ‘imaginative art’ 
is simply not taken up in the sense in which Feynman 
presented it: as the genesis of new ideas, or seeing-
the-as-yet-unseen. Instead, in an environment of ever 
more information, ever less time, ever more complex 
problems, and ever less taste for inadvertent failure, 
the call goes out for improved rigour, greater technical 
competency and superior critical thinking skills.
Nevertheless, there are indications that the profession 
may be ready to embrace the ‘imaginative’ alternative. 
Calls for innovation and creativity arise often in 
the context of hard or perplexing policy challenges. 
In these cases, analysts may face an abundance 
of information, but also a long history of policy 
development and change. For example, we have a 
good deal of information on behaviours that endanger 
health and safety, and yet frequently wonder whether 
policies are making much progress. It is often too easy 
to traverse the same old ground. In an information-
rich environment, analysts working conventionally 
face diminishing returns as they work and rework 
their explanatory models in ever fi ner detail. Different 
thinking might offer fresh ways of looking at the 
‘known’ and fresh ideas about what to do. 
The challenges of ‘joined-up’ or ‘cross-cutting’ policy 
making highlight another limitation of conventional 
approaches. While these terms call attention to the 
fact that social reality is holistic, government responses 
– and the research and analysis that underpin them 
– tend to be fragmented. Disciplinary models, theories 
and variables of all descriptions comprise the piecemeal 
ingredients for whole-of-government efforts, but 
sentence specialist analysts to painstaking re-assembly 
work. Different thinking might provide an integrating 
framework to enable them to work more productively 
with the inevitable fragments of knowledge. 
Even when attempting to address hard and cross-
cutting issues differently within an integrating frame of 
reference, analysts may retain a ‘fi x-it’ orientation. In this 
view, cross-cutting issues, and even genuinely complex 
issues, are just bigger and more unruly than the old ones: 
analysts need to try harder to get answers, make better 
use of what they know, have better strategies to exert 
greater control over the unpredictable mess. But what 
happens if that control remains elusive? If, try as they 
might, analysts have scant ground to stand on before it 
is swept away by some new current? Different thinking 
might facilitate the design and continual improvement 
of fl exible, resilient, perhaps systemic, policy suited 
to a complex situation that lacks ‘answers’. A recent 
statement from the Hon Pete Hodgson on obesity evokes 
this challenge: ‘making rules before changing attitudes 
is pointless. This is about changing our lifestyles. Quick 
fi xes don’t happen. No country has cracked this or begun 
to. We want to be among the fi rst.’
Robert Klitgaard, refl ecting on Schelling’s contribution 
to policy analysis, notes that 
in real policy making the intellectual problem 
is often ... how to discover, how to be more 
creative about, the objectives, the alternatives, 
and the constraints. In other words, how to 
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understand, expand, and enrich the ‘if ’. The 
rejected [rational] paradigm says that the policy 
maker’s problem is deciding among many given 
courses of action. Schelling’s version turns this 
radically around. The problem is understanding, 
indeed generating, the objectives and the range 
of alternatives. Once policymakers have done 
that, they usually do well at making decisions. 
They are already pretty good at the ‘then’ part; 
they may need help on the ‘if ’. 
The time appears ripe in New Zealand for moving 
beyond new-thinking rhetoric to practical, enhanced 
production of the ‘if ’. In the lead article of this journal’s 
fi rst issue, Gary Hawke, writing as head of the School 
of Government, and Michael Wintringham, writing as 
the outgoing state services commissioner, noted that 
‘governments want a public service which is innovative, 
able to respond to new challenges and not merely one 
which maintains familiar routines’. They further noted 
that agencies need to adjust ‘international best practice’ 
with understanding of the local context, which requires 
‘creativity and innovation’. 
Alternative types of thinking and 
reasoning
In this section I contrast critical thinking with creative 
thinking, and other overlapping and interrelated types of 
thinking that may, or should, be exercised by otherwise 
competent analytical or critical thinkers. However, there 
are plenty of common elements among the various 
modes. In particular, they all imply a certain searching 
and discerning inquiry, grounded in the requirements 
of public and practical reasoning. It is both possible 
and necessary, in my view, for policy thinkers to move 
beyond stale arguments that critical and creative 
thinking are ontologically and epistemologically too 
different to be joined together.
Analytical, or critical, thinking
In the State Services Commission’s list of core 
competencies for policy analysts, two types of thinking 
skills are noted, the fi rst of which is analytical: 
the ability to analyse issues from a multi-
disciplinarian focus, to unbundle problems and 
reconstitute them, to develop concepts based on 
sound theoretical and empirical knowledge, to be 
logical, to critique and be sceptical, to perceive 
the requirements for action or implementation, 
and to simplify complex problems. 
Analysts break apart a problem, seeking to understand its 
components and relationships, then address the search 
for a solution by considering the array of ‘evidence’ 
that helps to explain the components and relationships. 
Careful logical work results in the selection of the 
‘best’ advice to offer a decision maker. Great critical 
thinkers work brilliantly with existing knowledge to 
reach a defi nitive conclusion. It is Star Trek’s Spock’s 
exemplary ‘if ... then’ reasoning, as summarised by 
Walters: Spock can ‘get to the heart of an argument by 
stripping through rhetorical gloss, emotional ephemera, 
and cognitive confusion’. The critical thinker, Walters 
continues, ‘draw[s] conclusions only when there is 
enough evidence to warrant them and refuse[s] to 
go beyond the limits of logical probability’. Critical 
thinking can be explained by a series of logical rules. It 
is also entirely reactive, fi nding application to existing 
arguments and problems.
Within this overall paradigm, creativity shows in two 
activities. First, after taking a problem apart, analysts 
seek to recombine elements, to reconstitute them in 
more informative ways. Second, creativity emerges in the 
thinking of the most adept critical thinkers. Such a person 
knows the rules of problem solving so thoroughly that 
she can apply them in new ways and in new situations. 
Dora Costa and Matt Kahn, for example, used economic 
thinking to discover how social capital worked in the 
American Civil War. They showed why some soldiers risked 
death despite ubiquitous low pay and weak punishment 
strategies, while others shirked their duties. 
Creative, or design, thinking
In the State Services Commission’s list, the second 
thinking competency is defi ned as ‘innovative’. It is 
‘the ability to think laterally about a policy issue, to 
challenge existing concepts and assumptions, and to 
propose creative alternatives’. Creative thinking is 
this domain of ‘what if ...’. Walters contrasts the pure 
critical thinking of Spock with tacit, non-reductionist, 
non-sequential, hunch-pursuing thinking. Many state 
servants exhibit such thinking: the social worker who 
develops a feeling for ‘risks’ in a household, the teacher 
who works out a way to engage a previously uninterested 
student, or the conservationist who conceives of land 
encircled by a predator-proof fence. Creative thinking, 
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by defi nition, enables a person to formulate new ideas, 
and, indeed, new problems. It has also been called 
‘synthetic’ thinking, which draws attention to making 
connections between seemingly disparate pieces of a 
puzzle. Its outputs can then become inputs for critical 
thinking. Creative thinking naturally retains wholes, and 
concentrates on broad patterns rather than fi ne detail. 
Signifi cantly, creative thinking arises within a discrete 
context and on the basis of a background of established 
knowledge and conventional perceptions. It is not a case 
of ‘anything goes’. ‘What if ...’ constructions must be 
genuinely capable of extending understanding or action 
(not merely odd or unconventional).
‘Design’ thinking is a special case of creative thinking, 
with an express practical aim. It is the practical reasoner’s 
creative thinking. Whether one is designing a toaster 
or a local tourism campaign, design thinking skills 
include: objective-led, constrained inventiveness; ability 
to visualise; bias for adaptivity (solutions that not only 
solve the immediate problem but can be adapted to 
changing demands and needs); systemic vision; ability 
to use language to reveal and explain patterns and distil 
complex phenomena to their essence; self-governing 
practicality (tempering unconstrained creativity with 
practicality); and the ability to work systematically with 
qualitative information.
Case-based/analogical/legal reasoning and 
interpretation 
Legal reasoning is Janus-faced, mindful of precedent, 
encompassing both a backward-looking conserving 
component and a forward-looking creative one. Treating 
cases as discrete, but composed of a number of elements, 
analysts ‘solve’ new problems by analogy and controlled 
interpretation of the current case with others. Analogical 
thinking works with patterned wholes, unlike analytical 
thinking, which seeks to unbundle the elements. Its logic 
is abductive, characterised by the creation of plausible 
hypotheses (see Box 2). 
Cognitive scientists have shown that people naturally 
think with patterns, and with vague or approximate 
categories. A variable, such as ‘health’ or ‘old’ or ‘fl uent’, 
has blurred, or ‘fuzzy’, edges. In fuzzy set theory, degrees 
of set membership are allowed, such as ‘fully healthy’ 
and ‘neither healthy nor unhealthy’, using categories 
established by the researcher. Fuzzy logic, underpinned 
by analogical reasoning, allows social scientists to make 
inferences based on such vague concepts systematically. 
It sets up ‘if ... then’ rules but applies them holistically, 
as in the rule, ‘if a person is unhealthy, then treat with 
care’, where both ‘unhealthy’ and ‘care’ can vary over 
Box 2: Abductive logic
Recently, abduction, a mode of logic fi rst defi ned 
by Aristotle, has been revitalised in applications 
ranging from artifi cial intelligence and criminal 
investigation to business strategy. Following 
Peirce, abduction is the mode of inquiry for 
making plausible explanations for interesting or 
puzzling observations. Abduction produces an 
initial inference, which can be further investigated 
via inductive and deductive rules: some observed 
anomaly leads to a hypothesis that would (if true) 
explain the anomaly. 
For example, the Ministry of Social Development 
recently investigated Sickness Benefi t and Invalid 
Benefi t clients’ needs and aspirations by drawing 
on the belief systems, values and attitudes of the 
clients themselves. In a small pilot study, the 
research team observed a suggestive difference 
in the responses of Mäori and New Zealand 
Europeans to the benefi t system. While 14 of 
20 New Zealand Europeans in the study were 
associated with the ‘unhappy’ or ‘negative’ 
attitude clusters (e.g., having a ‘sense of being 
entitled to support’ or a ‘sense of being a victim 
of stigma’), all Mäori who showed strong views 
were associated with ‘happy’ or ‘positive’ attitudes. 
This observation could be followed up with more 
study and discussion with caseworkers.
Abduction, crucially, describes a wide range of 
intrinsically creative acts of thought sparked 
by perception. An abductive thought may be 
an insight, as in Archimedes’ original eureka 
moment in the bath. Abduction comes into play 
when a thinker forms a metaphor to convey a 
fuzzy, relational or holistic resemblance (e.g., of 
a school as a ‘prison’ or a ‘garden’), and when she, 
like Sherlock Holmes, deciphers a clue or detects 
a pattern. Finally, abduction is the logical means 
by which a thinker resolves the meaning, for her, 
of some facts, patterns and so on.
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a continuous range. Fuzzy logic in policy analysis can 
assist in the detection of similarities and differences 
between cases and in systems analysis.
Strategic thinking
Strategic thinking contributes to a form of practical 
reasoning specifi cally highlighting the consideration 
of assumptions and alternative courses of action where 
there is signifi cant and challenging uncertainty, and 
where there is heightened recognition that new courses 
of action are needed. A prominent school of strategic 
thinking explicitly evokes thinking’s creative qualities. 
Liedtka defi nes strategic thinking as a blend of critical 
and creative thinking. She notes that it is abductive, 
future-focused and inventive. Similarly, Mintzberg notes 
that strategic thinking is a synthesising process utilising 
intuition and creativity, whose outcome is ‘an integrated 
perspective of the enterprise’. The strategic thinker 
marshals a broad range of inputs – existing knowledge, 
constraints, objectives, multiple points of view and so 
on – and tests various confi gurations for their coherence 
and fi t within the given parameters. Strategic thinking 
exemplifi es continuous learning, involving trial and 
error, iteration and the ‘emergence’ of learning. 
Refl ective thinking
Refl ective thinking is not directly practically focused, 
but instead serves to strengthen the practical thinker’s 
capacities. In thinking reflectively, an individual 
inquires inwards to help refine her understanding 
of an experience, which may lead to changes in her 
perspectives and in subsequent behaviours that result in 
turn in new insights and deeper understandings of her 
experiences. Refl ection is evaluative and judgemental. 
It allows for the interconnections between observations, 
past experiences and judgement to come to the fore in 
decision making. It suggests the meaning of experience 
and promotes a deep approach to learning because it 
encourages problem reframing, questioning assumptions 
and considering multiple perspectives. Importantly, 
refl ective thinking is invoked when analysts look at 
the moral dimensions of their work, which can lead 
to modifi ed practices in the future, or to more direct 
actions, such as protest.
Collective thinking and wisdom
Like refl ective thinking, collective thinking can work 
indirectly to strengthen other thinking. (It can also 
malfunction, a phenomenon known as ‘groupthink’.) 
However, whereas refl ective thinking must be specifi cally 
attended to if it is to be of value (and so is often 
considered a luxury by continually time-pressed public 
servants), all thinkers automatically tap into the broader 
fl ow of human knowledge and experience to some 
degree. At one level, this statement merely acknowledges 
that culture and society condition our thoughts by 
providing language and selecting facts and theories 
for our possible attention. However, a ‘switched-on’ 
thinker is alert to these infl uences and actively copes 
with them. At a somewhat less obvious level, the notion 
of collective thinking suggests that, particularly with 
public and practical reasoning, knowledge is systemic. 
No one person can have the whole answer. 
Further, in everyday usage ‘wisdom’ – although conceived 
as an individualistic quality – is defi ned with reference to 
some jointly produced knowledge and applies, according 
to Baltes and Staudinger, to the ‘fundamental pragmatics 
of life’, which are, at least in part, social. That is, despite 
the guru on the mountain-top cliché, a person cannot be 
‘wise’ without rich practical knowledge, and knowledge 
of the relativities of values and their social priorities. In 
addition, the ‘wisdom of crowds’ attracts contemporary 
interest. Especially as popularised by Surowiecki, in a wide 
range of examples, the many reach better decisions than the 
few, even if the few are considered ‘experts’. Finally, wisdom 
is creative. For McKenna and Rooney, wisdom arises in a 
‘subjective, transcendent, imaginative mental process’.
Towards a renewed focus on the inquir-
er and the inquiry
The time is ripe to consider how educators and managers 
can better encourage analysts, new and mid-career, to 
think creatively using cases and design thinking, and 
to draw more effectively upon refl ective and collective 
thinking. In this fi nal section I propose some ways to 
support and enhance other ways of thinking. First, 
however, I consider the case that, notwithstanding the 
interrelatedness of critical and creative thinking, we 
would be best advised to focus solely on improving 
analysts’ critical capacities.
Do nothing/focus solely on increasing the 
rational critical skills of analysts 
The case against increased emphasis on teaching and 
developing creative thinking includes three arguments. 
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First, if creativity is viewed as a higher-order skill, then 
users have to be ready and able to use it. There may be 
concerns that people are expected to run before they can 
walk. Undue focus on creativity might undermine the 
priority of analytic and critical capacity. Second, even if 
we did try to develop more creative analysts, they would 
not last. They might become frustrated at the failure 
of politicians and other offi cials to take up their ideas. 
Or they might fi nd their ideas usurped by a political 
system that reserves for itself the right to be creative. 
Third, emphasising creativity could create an upsurge 
in pseudo-creative razzle-dazzle, attracting people 
with modest technical skills but over-sized notions of 
the worth of their ideas. The clear communication of 
critical thinking might be stymied or perverted in a 
more hyped-up atmosphere. 
Ultimately, the reasons against focusing more on creative 
thinking and its hybrids lack persuasiveness. Pure creative 
thinking will remain a minority occupation for most 
policy advisers. But creative, abductive thinking is natural 
and it would require draconian, not to say counter-
productive, methods to check it. Nurturing creativity 
is not zero-sum with developing critical thinking skills. 
Running through the case against is a fear that the overall 
quality of advice will suffer because creative thinking 
squeezes out critical thinking. If so, it is a minor risk 
worth taking. As story after story in science and art attest, 
dissatisfaction or some other discomfort with the status 
quo, along with curiosity about the unknown, is precisely 
the spur to new, breakthrough ideas. 
Education-based responses
Creativity can be taught, although it is also clear that 
people naturally vary in their talents. For example, 
variously talented art students may all be taught how 
to observe, copy, work with their materials, but their 
results will not all be fi rst-rate. While I am aware of 
some scattered efforts to develop creative thinking 
skills for policy analysis, there is little supporting 
literature beyond that treating techniques (such as 
brainstorming) or providing mere exhortation. Other 
elements of alternative modes of thinking are better 
established: strategic thinking, refl ective practice 
and ‘thinking in time’ as a policy analytic technique 
have been taught for years (though, arguably, not 
with enough attention). Moreover, if these are taught 
only in programmes that otherwise feature analytic 
and critical thinking, then creative production of 
new ideas could be constrained within the critical 
paradigm. 
Several joint design and professional practice business 
programmes have been established in recent years, 
including at the Rotman School of Business in Toronto 
and at Stanford. At Stanford’s ‘D-School’, students 
from engineering, social sciences, education and 
design form collaborative teams to solve problems 
and learn creative methodologies. The Institute of 
Design at the Illinois Institute of Technology, another 
design school leader, has developed a ‘blueprint’ for a 
master’s programme with a goal ‘to fuse design skills 
and methods with policy knowledge and techniques to 
create an individual capable of developing innovative 
and relevant solutions to the many problems facing 
public policy today’. In all of these examples the 
pedagogy stresses learning by doing in diverse teams, 
rather than learning and practising techniques. The 
underlying principles embrace complexity and the 
designer’s own situatedness in the problem context. 
But, because the designers are practical reasoners, 
their ideas have also to pass muster in a business or 
public setting.
An ‘intensive’ or ‘immersion’ course, long established 
in US pre-career policy programmes, and increasingly 
popular at Victoria University’s School of Government, 
might be adapted to foster creativity. Like the design 
school models, an intensive course could mix together 
people of very different experiences, set a real task and 
(possibly) forgo the classroom setting for the real-world 
laboratory. 
Within the regular curriculum, some additional 
proposals include:
• Students could be encouraged or required to 
undertake some historical inquiry and courses in 
literature and arts.
• Refl ective journal-keeping could be mandatory, 
with students encouraged to refl ect across both the 
curriculum and their experiences.
• More class time could be devoted to the complex and 
challenging problems (those that do not make good 
‘textbook’ examples), and explicitly approached in 
different ways.
• Multidisciplinary methods could be explicitly taught, 
modelled and practised. 
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Workplace-based responses
Professional development opportunities might usefully 
be developed along the educational lines sketched 
above (such as work-release to take part in design 
intensives). A range of additional workplace efforts 
could enhance and support creativity. Apprenticeships 
and mentoring both establish intensive relationships 
(one-to-one or one-to-team) that foster learning 
through practice, open questioning of practice and 
reflection. While some departments already have 
some mechanisms to close the learning loop on 
completed projects, more could be done to disseminate 
examples of good and bad thinking, and to maintain 
a clearing-house-style repository of good examples. 
These suggestions transplant the ‘case-based’ model 
of learning in an educational setting to the practice 
setting, so that practitioners can better draw lessons for 
their own practice from narratives of others’ practice. A 
key would be to present these narratives with explicit 
attention to multiple frames of analysis, the ins and 
outs of iterative learning towards a solution, and 
refl ections on any direct engagement with ‘creative’ 
thinking. Finally, there is scope for departments to 
target more resources towards encouraging creativity to 
fl ourish within policy-realistic constraints. Such efforts 
need to be more than fl ash-in-the-pan sessions, and 
might perhaps become a regular facet of departments’ 
forward-looking research plans. 
These suggestions emphasise the development of 
thinking and reasoning, rather than the development 
of knowledge-handling skills only. They require a 
culture of ‘space and safety’ that would provide the 
necessary conditions for creative and innovative 
thinking. They have implications for the manner 
in which staff are recruited and managed, both as 
individuals and as members of teams, and for life-long 
learning. They privilege the experience that is a sine qua 
non of professional practice. The case for encouraging 
the fl ourishing of creative thinking for policy analysis 
and advice is robust. The time is right. What ideas do 
you have?
A note on sources
In addition to comments from colleagues at a School 
of Government seminar, I wish to acknowledge helpful 
comments from Jonathan Boston, Bob Gregory, Gary 
Hawke and David King.
References cited in the text: E. Bardach, A Practical 
Guide for Policy Analysis: the eightfold path to more 
effective problem solving (2nd ed.), Washington, DC: 
CQ Press, 2005; P.B. Baltes and U.M. Staudinger, ‘A 
metaheuristic (pragmatic) to orchestrate mind and 
virtue toward excellence’, American Psychologist, 55 
(2000); P. Callaghan, ‘Afterword: luminous moments’, 
in Are Angels OK? The parallel universes of New Zealand 
writers and scientists, Wellington: Victoria University 
Press, 2006; D. Costa and M. Kahn, ‘Cowards and 
heroes: group loyalty in the American Civil War’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2) (May 2003); 
D.T. Ellwood, ‘From research to social policy and 
back again: translating scholarship into practice 
through the starry eyes of a sometimes scarred veteran’, 
keynote address, Social Policy Research and Evaluation 
conference, Wellington, 2003; G. Hawke and M. 
Wintringham, ‘Research and government: feeding 
knowledge into public policy’, Policy Quarterly, 1 (1) 
(2005); R. Klitgaard, ‘Thomas Schelling and policy 
analysis’, http://www.cgu.edu/include/Schelling_and_
Policy_analysis.pdf, accessed 1 June 2006; J. Liedtka, 
‘Strategy as design’, Rotman Management (Winter 2004); 
R. Peace et al., ‘Wellbeing, employment, independence: 
the views of Sickness and Invalids’ Benefi t clients’, 
working paper 07/04, Wellington: Ministry of Social 
Development, 2004; B. McKenna and D. Rooney, 
‘Wisdom management: tensions between theory and 
practice in practice’, paper prepared for the Knowledge 
Management Asia Pacific conference, Wellington, 
28–29 November 2005, http://kmap2005.vuw.ac.nz/
papers/wisdom%20management.pdf; H. Mintzberg, 
The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, New York: The 
Free Press, 1994; T. Schelling, ‘The intimate contest for 
self-command’, The Public Interest, 60 (Summer 1980); 
K.S. Walters, ‘Critical thinking, rationality, and the 
vulcanisation of students’, in Walters (ed.), Re-thinking 
Reason: new perspectives in critical thinking, Albany: 
SUNY, 2004; A. Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: the 
art and craft of policy analysis, Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1979; J. Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: 
why the many are smarter than the few and how collective 
wisdom shapes business, economics, societies, and nations, 
New York: Doubleday, 2004.
Other sources drawn on: for the ‘blueprint’ of a design 
and policy analysis school, see S. Babitch, E.G. Fort, Y. 
Kasemkosolsri, C. Kim and S.B. Nelson, ‘Education 
for policy design synthesis’, http://www.id.iit.edu/
V
ol
um
e 
2,
 N
um
be
r 
3 
20
06
23
profi le/gallery/designthinking/EPDS_presentation.pdf; 
for characteristics of design thinking, see C.L. Owen. 
‘Design thinking: What it is. Why it is different. Where 
it has new value’, speech delivered to the Life and 
Design in the Future conference, Gwangju City, Korea, 
21 October 2005, http://www.it.iit.edu/papers/owen_
korea.pdf; for types of knowledge and commentary 
on D. Schön’s contributions, see W. Parsons, ‘Not just 
steering but weaving: relevant knowledge and the craft 
of building policy capacity and coherence’, Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, 63 (1) (2004); for 
fuzzy logic in social science, see C. Ragin, Fuzzy Set 
Social Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000; for an introduction to Peirce and abduction, 
see G. Shank, ‘It’s logic in practice, my dear Watson: 
an imaginary memoir from beyond the grave’, Forum 
qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative social 
research, http://qualitative-research.net/fqs-eng-htm, 
posted February 2001, accessed 8 April 2005.
Amanda Wolf  is a Senior Lecturer 
in the School of  Government at 
Victoria University of  Wellington. 
Her main research interests include 
methodologies for policy research, 
information-based policies and 
subjectivity in policy contexts.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, STRATEGY 
AND COMMUNITIES
An Institute of Policy Studies 
Publication by the Local Futures Research 
Project
Local Government, Strategy and Communities 
provides information and analysis on changing 
strategic planning practices under the Local 
Government Act 2002. The experiences of 19 
local and regional councils are examined as they 
worked with their communities to prepare a ten 
year Long Term Council Community Plan.
The authors, the Local Futures Research Project, 
have raised important policy issues regarding 
the role of local government in New Zealand, 
the merits and demerits of strategic planning in 
community settings, and a whole-of-government 
approach to strategy development.
Published  - May 2006
Format – B5 Paperback, pp 228
ISBN – 1-877347-09-4
Price - $29.95 (incl P&P within NZ)
To have a copy of Local Government, Strategy and 
Communities and an invoice sent to you please 
email, phone, fax or mail your order to
Institute of Policy Studies
Victoria University of Wellington
Email ipos@vuw.ac.nz
Telephone +64 4 463 5307
Fax +64 4 463 7413
PO Box 600, Wellington
New Zealand 
